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OPENING THE BLACK BOX OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REFORM: A STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL ANALYSIS OF
AGENCY RESPONSES TO TERMINATION THREATS
KATHARINE DOMMETT
UNIVERSITY OF SHEFFIELD
CHRIS SKELCHER
UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
ABSTRACT: How do public agencies respond when reform proposals threaten
downsizing, reduction in functions, or termination? Agency survival during administrat-
ive reform is conventionally explained by structural characteristics, informed by the
hardwiring thesis derived from the politics of the U.S. federal government. Parliamen-
tary systems provide greater opportunity for agency reform, but there is little evidence
of how agencies respond to such proposals or how proposals are altered prior to
decision. We consider agencies as active participants in the reform processes, using
strategic-relational theory to analyse their strategizing. The article employs detailed
empirical evidence on 12 agencies subject to reform by the UK government between
2010 and 2013. We identify three archetypical defence strategies—technical expert,
network node, and marginal adaptor—and argue that coding agency strategies along-
side structural analysis can help better explain reform outcomes.
RETHINKING AGENCY REFORM
This article asks an important question, but one that is seldom addressed in the
literature: How do public agencies respond when reform proposals threaten
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downsizing, reduction in functions, or even termination? The question is important
because processes of autonomization have resulted in agencies becoming a ubiqui-
tous feature of contemporary governance internationally (Verhoest et al. 2010). This
broad class of organizations undertake functions delegated to them by political
principals in order that they can exercise judgement free from partisan influence.
For this reason, agencies have been used extensively in the regulatory sector, but they
also deliver public services, provide expert advice, and undertake quasi-judicial func-
tions at the interface between citizen and state. The independent status of agencies
potentially creates a constraint on their reform since the underlying logic is that they
should stand outside partisan politics, acting in the wider and long-term public inter-
est. Yet administrative reform provides a means through which governing elites can
realize their policy goals; thus, proposals to abolish, reform, or create agencies are
intended to terminate or restrict the policy commitments of previous governments
and to enhance and embed those of the new regime (Bertelli 2006). In some jurisdic-
tions, such as the United States, independence is privileged to the extent of giving
some agencies constitutional or budgetary protection. This institutional condition,
taken together with the separation of powers system, makes reform a politically
difficult ambition to achieve, leading to the hypothesis of agency immortality
(Kaufman 1976). In the UK and a number of other countries, in contrast, partisan-
ship is privileged over independence and so agencies become the focus of regular
reform initiatives as the political complexion and policy preferences of governments
change (Flinders and Skelcher 2012).
Although agencies embody the idea of political independence, they typically
operate within policy, performance, and accountability frameworks specified by
government and=or the legislature. The content of these frameworks vary along
an autonomy-control dimension, and any individual agency may be closer in to or
further out from a minister than its peers. Consequently, formal independence is
relative rather than absolute. In addition, independence is negotiated on a day-to-
day basis along the boundary between the agency, its ministry, and other stake-
holders (van Thiel and Yesilkagit 2011). The way the agency interprets its mission,
how it undertakes its tasks, and the framing of its conclusions and decisions are
all politically salient and potentially subject to attempts by external actors to exert
influence. As a result, the management of independence is inherent in the ethos of
the agency (Carpenter 2001; Christensen and Lægreid 2004).
Given these observations, one might expect agencies actively to respond to reform
proposals and seek to influence them, rather than passively to comply. Yet this
proposition has been subject to little investigation, meaning we have limited under-
standing of the factors that determine the way agencies strategize in the face of
incipient reform. To date, the literature on agency reform has principally focused
on population ecology models that track year-by-year differences in the pool of
agencies, and treat appearance and disappearance as the product respectively of cre-
ation or abolition. Yet, as authors within this literature recognize, reform is a more
complex process (MacCarthaigh 2012; Verhoest, Verschuere, and Bouckaert 2007).
While the continued presence of an agency from year to year tells us that it has
not been terminated, these data do not illuminate whether other reform possibilities
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of a structural or functional nature (e.g., merger or change of organizational type, or
an increase or reduction in tasks) have been enacted.
Further, we know little about what happens in the space between the proposals
for and decisions on reform. Reform proposals seek to change institutional
arrangements and by their very nature will affect the rules of the game and the polit-
ical relationships between different actors (March and Olsen 1983). They open up an
arena in which there may be considerable contestation, as agencies, ministries, legis-
latures, and interest groups struggle for an outcome that best reflects their interests,
or in which the proposals are broadly accepted. Agencies can seek to frustrate or
alter reform proposals, as Overman, Van Thiel, and Lafrage’s (2014) study of Dutch
and French agencies recognizes. Thus, reform decisions may or may not reflect the
initial proposals, and this may in part be due to agency strategizing.
We take a fresh look at these questions by opening the black box of agency
responses to reform proposals. In this article, we argue that agencies under threat
should be conceived as active players who strategize in a political contest over their
future, and who have the potential to intervene in the process by which government
proceeds from initial reform proposal to final reform decision. We make a novel
move by applying strategic-relational theory to the analysis of administrative reform
in order to reveal how agencies understand the opportunities for and constraints on
their agency (hereinafter termed ‘‘volition’’ to avoid confusion with the organiza-
tions in question). Strategic-relational theory overcomes the limitations of structural
analysis by recognizing that structure and volition are mutually constitutive in parti-
cular empirical moments, and are only separable at the analytical level. Thus, an
actor’s choice of strategy is influenced by his=her calculation about the nature of
the context, which itself is strategically selective—in other words, the specific context
favors certain actions over others. Strategic-relational theory thus provides a way of
recognizing the structural, but integrates this with an actor orientation. We use this
theory as an analytical framework in order to offer new insights into and explana-
tions of agencies’ responses to exogenous threats of termination or reform. The
empirical case examined here is the UK coalition government’s public body reform
policy, which we have tracked over the three years since its announcement in May
2010. We examine the characteristics and strategies of 12 agencies proposed for
reform (including, but not limited to, termination) as part of the government’s drive
to substantially reduce the expenditure and increase the accountability of non-
departmental public bodies which operate at arm’s length to ministers.
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATIONS OF AGENCY TERMINATION
The public administration literature on agency termination predominantly adopts
a structural explanation of agency survival=hazard rates. Lewis (2002; 2004) and
Carpenter and Lewis (2004) provide the theoretical foundation for this ‘‘design’’
or ‘‘hardwiring’’ thesis. The hypothesis is that ‘‘public organizations that are
‘endowed’ with certain structural features—such as political insulation, a specific
organizational structure, and statutory recognition—enjoy higher survival chances
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than those without these birth characteristics’’ (Boin, Kuipers, and Steenbergen
2010, 385). This draws on the U.S. literature on delegation, credible commitment,
and agency problems. Essentially, Lewis and colleagues propose that legislators
choose agency insulation as an ex ante means to lock in their policy preferences
and that such insulated agencies are more durable because they produce policy
outputs closer to the relatively constant Congressional median.
It is important to be aware that this theoretical framing is predicated on the poli-
tics of division of powers government as it operates in the U.S. This has a particular
set of institutional conditions that are not found in parliamentary systems, and may
not be found in some other nations with division of powers constitutions. Parliamen-
tary systems, such as the UK’s, offer much greater opportunity for a government to
realize its political goals since, by definition, it commands the majority in the legis-
lature, and so creation of an agency does not hardwire a commitment beyond the life
of a government; the next government will have the possibility of reforming or ter-
minating that agency. This has three consequences. Firstly, we might expect agency
reform to be proposed more often, since changing organizational structures is one of
the ways in which governments seek to realize their policies. Secondly, proposals are
in the main likely to be adopted, due to the government’s legislative majority and the
wide executive powers of ministers. And thirdly, strategizing is likely to be a normal
response by agencies because of their greater exposure to reform.
Our view, therefore, is that the tendency of this literature to treat agencies as passive
actors is unsatisfactory. From the theoretical perspective, it leads to a deterministic
explanation of agency reform proposals that fails to accommodate the volition of
agencies themselves. It does not help us understand the extent to which the interplay
between agencies on the one hand, and government, legislators, and other stake-
holders on the other hand, affect their chances of survival, and thus lacks a sense of
political contestation that is often associated with such proposals. Methodologically,
there are problems in employing theory generated in one constitutional environment
and applying it to others. In policy terms, scholars’ ability to advise on reform are con-
strained by a lack of understanding about how agencies behave. Understanding how
and why agencies respond, and what effects this has, can improve the design and
execution of administrative reform. Our approach is not presented as antithetical to
population ecology accounts; rather, it offers a complementary research strategy to
further advance understanding of agency reform, as we discuss in the conclusion.
STRATEGIC-RELATIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF AGENCY REFORM
We utilize strategic-relational theory (Hay 2002) as an analytical framework for
our empirical study. To our knowledge, this approach has not been employed in
the literature on administrative reform, although it has been used to explain behavior
in other public policy systems; for example, the politics of Indian highway develop-
ment (Chettiparamb 2007) and the privatization of the Mexican oil sector (Heigl
2011). Strategic-relational theory has developed in response to the ontological ten-
sion between absolute structural determinism and totally free-willed actors. It
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resolves this tension by arguing that structure and volition are analytical rather than
empirical categories, and thus the focus of scholarly effort should be on investigating
the social relations between them. The relationship is understood as that between a
strategically selective context that favors certain action strategies (e.g., lobbying,
protests, rational argument, etc.) over others, and strategic actors who calculate their
possible moves in the light of an appreciation of that context. Actors select their
action strategies in light of an appreciation of the opportunities and constraints
offered by this context; that is, its strategic selectivity. Actors inevitably face
problems of bounded rationality in formulating their strategies. However, we do
not presuppose that they are ‘‘rational actors’’ in the sense of being motivated prin-
cipally by an imperative for agency survival. Our data below suggest a wider range of
motivations, and thus the strategic-relational approach enables us to avoid imputing
a priori assumptions about actor interests. Furthermore, the theory contends that
since actors are reflexive, they learn as a result of their actions. Similarly, their
actions may have some effect on the context, thus changing its strategic selectivity.
Consequently, this approach brings ‘‘agency into structure—producing a structured
context (an action setting)—and (brings) structure into agency—producing a contex-
tualised actor (a situated agent)’’ (Hay 2002, 128).
In our empirical analysis, we concentrate on two components of the strategic-
relational model: the actor’s strategic calculation (in other words, the way in which each
agency and specifically its top-level board appreciates the contextually defined oppor-
tunities for and constraints on its responses) and the strategic action it subsequently
takes. Our focus on the agency’s board reflects the hierarchical nature of such organiza-
tions and the board’s key role in managing the relationship with its environment
through an emergent strategy (Chia and MacKay 2007). Through these means, we
aim to show how a study of agency volition can complement the insights of structural
analysis to develop a more detailed awareness of the role and significance of actors in
the reform process, and also to advocate the case for a more iterative mode of analysis.
RESEARCH DESIGN
We examine 12 cases selected from the program of Public Bodies’ Reform initiated
by the incoming UK coalition government in May 2010 (Flinders and Skelcher
2012).1 This program exhibits different types of reform proposal and agency response
within a constant political environment, making it ideal for studying the pertinence of
agency volition. Following a rapid cross-Whitehall review of all 264 types of public
body, 165 were proposed for reform in October 20102—either by the abolition
of the body and its functions; the abolition of the body and transfer of all or some of
its functions to government, other agencies or business=non-profits; the merger of two
or more bodies (possibly with changes to functions); or retaining but substantially
reforming the body (Cabinet Office 2010). We undertook a scoping study of the
165 types of public body proposed for reform and constructed a purposive sample of
12 bodies that were subject to the main types of reform proposal, exhibited different
types of response to proposed reforms, and undertook non-trivial functions (Table 1).
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Unlike many large N analyses which focus on reform outcomes, we seek to reveal
how proposals develop over time and can change in response to governmental, polit-
ical and, significantly, agencies’ responses. Thus, it is informative to map the reform
process as a whole, since variance in proposals for a single agency over time may
indicate the effects of agency strategizing, although we recognize that there may
be other explanatory factors; for example, lobbying by stakeholder groups, recon-
sideration in the light of consultation, or additional technical analysis of the
proposals.
Qualitative data were gathered on the history, governance, and functions of each
body, on the reform proposals and their justification, on the strategic calculation of
the body’s board, on their strategic actions, and on the response of government
(including iterations between calculation, action, and response in the period between
reform proposal and final decision). We used numerous documentary sources,
including the Hansard record of parliamentary debates, ministerial statements,
parliamentary select committee evidence, statements published by the agencies
themselves, and media=Web coverage. We conducted 70 semi-structured interviews,
of which 23 were with public body chairs and chief executives, 14 with parliamentar-
ians who were intimately involved in debates over bodies’ futures, and the balance
with civil servants and with the minister responsible for the reforms. These inter-
views typically lasted an hour, and were recorded and transcribed. The authors also
observed several workshops and meetings of public body chairs and chief executives,
as well as civil servants. Data coding was informed by a search for items that would
speak to the two core elements of the strategic-relational framework on which we
are focusing—how agencies appreciate their context and decide what actions to
take. Data were separately coded by the authors (only one of whom was involved
in gathering these data), and through several rounds of comparison the
sub-categories within each of the two theoretical constructs were inductively
developed.
STRATEGIC CALCULATION
Our interviews with board members gave us detailed insight into the way in which
agencies appreciated the contextually defined opportunities and constraints on action,
and how this impacted upon their response. Respondents were very open—in some
cases, remarkably so—about their relationship with their sponsoring ministry, includ-
ing individual ministers and civil servants, prior to and since the reform announce-
ment. This presented a challenge for our coding, as we needed to look beyond the
personalization of issues that flavored some accounts and seek out categories suitable
for comparative analysis. Informed by the existing literature on agency termination
and our empirical research, we identify four features of the strategically selective con-
text that all agencies consider in their calculation as to how to respond—the norms
applying to the constitutional position of public bodies, the embeddedness of a public
body in a constituency, the board’s prior knowledge of the reform proposal, and the
responsible minister’s political commitment to reform (Table 2).
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Constitutional Norms
Our interviews with public body chairs and chief executives revealed a strong
normative constraint on their actions by virtue of their constitutional position, which
initially appeared to challenge our agency strategizing hypothesis. There was
a consistent and strongly held view that it was not appropriate for them individually
or for their agency directly to challenge a government’s proposals for reform.
One interviewee asserted, ‘‘the Government has a perfect right to decide it wants
to do something different’’ (Interview 3), while another observed that agencies are
‘‘creatures of statute . . . here to serve the government’s wishes and deliver its policy’’
(Interview 4) and not to campaign against its policies. In accordance with this
rationale, chairs and chief executives asserted that it would be simply anathema
for a body set up with public money to ‘‘spend public money, fighting public money’’
(Interview 5), and hence any kind of lobbying activity was not seen to be ‘‘appropri-
ate’’ (Interview 6). This norm was a significant element in agencies’ appreciation of
the strategically selective context, and thus affected their action calculation.
This conclusion might lead us to suppose that the game is over, and that agencies
really are passive actors. Our data, however, tell a different story. The boundary
between publicly opposing the government’s proposals and pointing out the
problems with them is a fine one, and the boundary was stretched when the chairs
of two agencies (the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council [AJTC] and
the UK Film Council) made strong public statements on the undesirability of the
proposed reforms. Similarly, there is evidence that some agency chairs privately
expressed concern about reform proposals to ministers and civil servants.
It is clear that the boards of agencies exercised a subtle calculation in relation to the
logics of appropriateness within this normative environment. Our public body chairs
are not self-interested, rational actors seeking to defend their positions. They typically
have an established national reputation in business or the wider public service, and are
not dependent on the remuneration they receive as agency board chairs or the patron-
age of an appointment process. This position is best represented in the way one chair
described his normative environment: ‘‘[the] only limits imposed [are] by my own
judgement. People doing this job should be in a position to walk away if they need
to. And I’m lucky enough that I don’t need this job for financial reasons or anything
else’’ (Interview 7). Thus, the general disinclination to publicly oppose reform is rooted
in a judgement about the constitutional position of a public body and its board rather
than personal factors. Yet while chairs in general have refrained from public criticism
of the proposals to abolish their organizations, they remained highly committed to the
functions their agencies were originally created to exercise and wished to see these
continued in some way. For example, the chair of the AJTC used parliamentary
inquiries and other forums to argue the case for the continuance of his organization’s
role of independent oversight of the administrative justice system, but refrained from
explicitly arguing that this should be undertaken by the existing agency; instead, he set
out the principles that should inform the design of any new arrangements, some of
which (such as the need for an independent chair) were adopted in the government’s
somewhat different successor advisory forum [Interview 7].
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Embeddedness
The extent to which an agency is embedded in a wider constituency is an impor-
tant factor in a board’s calculation of how to respond to external reform pressures.
Our respondents uniformly regarded agency embeddedness as advantageous; as one
interviewee observed, ‘‘you’re safer as a quango if you’ve got [high] profile support’’
(Interview 8). There are indications from our data that embeddedness helps explain
an agency’s ability to survive attempts at reform. There was significant embedded-
ness in the three cases in which the government withdrew its reform proposals
(Youth Justice Board [YJB], Security Industry Authority [SIA], and the Chief
Coroner), as well as in several where changes were secured (the Forestry
Commission). A YJB respondent directly credited the change in the government’s
position to the agency’s ‘‘very powerful relationships with stakeholders: ACPO
[Association of Chief Police Officers] . . . the Magistrates’ Association, all the leading
reform groups, (and) the children’s charities . . . ’’ (Interview 3). However embedded-
ness is not necessarily sufficient to overcome reform pressures. The AJTC was
unable to survive, despite its high level of embeddedness, in large part because the
government had already made concessions over the YJB and Chief Coroner and
politically could not countenance a further weakening of its reform program. In
contrast, respondents in Consumer Focus, the Museums, Libraries and Archives
Council (MLA), and the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC)
lamented a lack of strong, effective relationships with stakeholders. As one intervie-
wee commented, the MLA ‘‘never had built up a strong base of support,’’ which
meant that ‘‘when it was announced it was going to be abolished, there were not
any screams of outrage . . . ’’ (Interview 9). Similarly, an EHRC respondent looked
in envy at the Forestry Commission because of its embeddedness with stakeholders
and ability to mobilize support (Interview 10). These differences reveal that agencies
have differential resource bases and hence illustrate why such bodies can make
different strategic calculations about their behavior when faced with the same
(or a similar) dilemma.
As Carpenter (2001) has highlighted, organizations can actively cultivate strong
links with exogenous actors such as stakeholders, and in many of the cases examined
here, such behavior was reported. For example, an interviewee within the Forestry
Commission attested, ‘‘We’ve spent the last 20 years becoming, particularly in
England, much more public facing, much more responsive to customer needs,’’ an
undertaking which was seen to be ‘‘repaid in stakeholder reactions’’ (Interview
12). In other cases, embeddedness is advanced by the circumstances of an agencies’
creation. Hence, one interviewee discussing the SIA felt that, because it was ‘‘the
industry that had pressed for regulation in the first place . . . it wasn’t likely, there-
fore, that the industry would be happy to go back to that situation of being unregu-
lated’’ (Interview 11). Similarly, the presence of stakeholders on an agency’s board
can facilitate relationships and embeddedness, as in the HTA, where one interviewee
described how ‘‘having a pathologist, having a coroner, having an anatomist or
whatever [on the] board has been immensely helpful’’ (Interview 6). However, the
ability of an agency to cultivate such supportive relationships is in part dependent
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on their function. For example, in the case of the MLA, the fact that they ‘‘were not
an advocacy body on behalf of museums’’ [but] . . . ‘‘a body of challenge to
museums . . .meant that positive relationships did not develop’’ (Interview 5).
Accordingly, the decision to act alone or with others is dictated by an agency’s
appreciation of its own unique relationship and level of embeddedness with other
organizations, as we discuss later.
Prior Knowledge
The topic on which our respondents became most exercised was when and how
they had been informed about the proposed reform. The experience of our case study
organizations varied dramatically. While all were aware that there was a possibility
that some agencies would be reformed, since this commitment featured in the 2010
general election manifestos of all three main political parties, there were significant
differences in the degrees of formal or informal notice received by individual
agencies. This was in part a reflection of the body’s connectivity with their sponsor
ministry as well as the nature of policy debates within that ministry. Hence, the
Forestry Commission was given notice of the likelihood of reform in a 2009 briefing
by a senior civil servant, but for Consumer Focus the decision was ‘‘a complete bolt
from the blue’’ (Interview 2).
Such differential experiences are of interest, as they affect the time available
to organizations to make a strategic calculation and, in turn, their ability to take
pre-emptive action. So, on the one hand, the SIA and EHRC, which had advance
notice, were able, respectively, to prime ‘‘people in the industry just to be wary, to
watch, to see what was going on’’ (Interview 11), and to formulate and deploy a
three pronged strategy in which they would ‘‘get a bit more ship shape,’’ ‘‘create . . . a
sort of wall of noise . . . to show that we were doing things,’’ and ‘‘develop a serious
strategy for focusing the Commission’s activity’’ (Interview 10). On the other hand,
bodies such as the HTA and Consumer Focus did not have advance notice and hence
were not aware of the need to favorably position themselves ahead of the reform
announcement. This difference helps to explain agencies’ reactions to proposals,
but also offers insight into their ability to take pre-emptive action because, as one
interviewee reflected, ‘‘once the announcement came, it would be too late [to save
the body]’’ (Interview 11).
Political Commitment
The final contextual element in an agency’s strategic calculation is the degree of
commitment to reform on the part of the government. A commonly cited presump-
tion for agency reform is, as Adam et al. (2007, 229) have argued, to ‘‘terminate
organizations which were created by their opponents.’’ We found little evidence
of this, the most notable case being the abolition of the Regional Development
Agencies (not in our sample) which were created under an earlier Labour
administration. In fact, bodies varied in the extent to which they thought there
was political commitment to their reform. In some cases, the government’s overall
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reform initiative was attenuated by the policy agenda of the ministry responsible for
a particular public body. For example, in the cases of Consumer Focus and the
HTA, the respective sponsoring departments recognized that the functions of these
agencies added value to their ministers’ policy commitments.
Such attenuation was not evident in all cases. Both the Audit Commission and
EHRC were subject to significant political commitment to reform at the ministerial
level. In the former case, the minister promoted a policy of ‘‘localism’’—in which
citizens would become ‘‘armchair auditors,’’ using greater transparency of expendi-
ture data to challenge local government decisions—and thus negating what he saw as
the intrusive central oversight and investigative role of the Audit Commission. With
the EHRC, the Government Equalities Office (the EHRC’s sponsor department)
expressly committed to enacting government reforms to the body, in part because
of concerns about its performance. Interviews with respondents in these agencies
clearly demonstrate that their readings of these contexts resulted in a strategic
calculation of the limited value of lobbying either the ministries or the Cabinet
Office, and instead resulted in alternative strategies—namely, pointing out the
technical problems of reform and mobilizing public support respectively.
STRATEGIC ACTION
The analysis of how agencies appreciated the strategically selective context demon-
strates that they are neither completely passive actors dominated by structural
factors, nor do they have unconstrained volition. They read the context in terms
of the opportunities for and constraints on action. But what are the choices they face
in deciding how to act in relation to that context? This is the second element of the
strategic-relational model that we consider in this article. Some initial typologizing
and theory building of organizations’ action strategies in response to external threats
has been undertaken in the management literature (Chattopadhyay, Glick, and
Huber 2001; Oliver 1991). However, such models are unable to account for the often
multifaceted nature of an agency’s reaction and do little to explain why any given
course of action was taken. Our empirical analysis shows that agencies are not
limited to singular responses but can deploy multiple strategies, and may have the
opportunity to act in cooperation with others. Therefore, our discussion of this issue
concentrates on three aspects that we have distilled from our analysis: the overall
framing of the response; the extent to which action has a public profile; and whether
the body acts alone or mobilizes others.
Framing the Response
Agencies positioned their responses in a number of different ways (Table 1).
At one end of the spectrum, there were bodies that cooperated with government
in an attempt to ‘‘try to make [reform] work as best we can’’ (Interview 12). This
approach was evident in, for example, the actions of the MLA, the UK Film
Council, and the Forestry Commission, which all cooperated with change even
as they tried to influence the nature of reforms. An MLA respondent commented,
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We very quickly made it clear [to our ministry] that we were doing no
public protesting. We made it clear that we had very strong views about
the necessity of transferring in a coherent way the capabilities that we had
honed. And we undertook to work closely in policy terms to make the
very best we could of that transition for the good of the sector. And
you could almost hear a sigh of relief because it meant we could then have
these conversations in a kind of intelligent professional way and make
sure as we did that every single worthwhile capability was transferred.
(Interview 5)
Similarly, a UK Film Council interviewee reported ‘‘on several occasions [ministry]
officials saying that they wouldn’t have been able to do any of this [reform] without
the support of the Film Council’’ (Interview 13).
At the other end of the spectrum, some agencies developed complex positioning
with plural strategies, often connected to the different functions of the agency
and=or its funding streams. Thus, Consumer Focus’ strategy in response to a pro-
posal to transfer its functions to a non-profit was to ‘‘give them half of it. Give
the government the general taxpayer funded work, but make a special case out of
this very precious, technical work that was funded from levy [non-governmental]
funds’’ (Interview 2). Similarly, the HTA sought to cooperate with the government
in making reforms while at the same time working to ensure that its functions, which
were under threat of fragmentation to different organizations, remained integrated.
A number of agencies discovered that information asymmetry between themselves
and their sponsor ministry provided an unexpected opportunity to frame their response
as helpful while also challenging the technical aspects of the reform proposal. Our inter-
views revealed that, in a number of cases, there were considerable gaps in the knowledge
of those generating the proposals regarding the exact functions of the body, the manner
in which they were discharged, and the significance of its external network for successful
policy delivery. This was exacerbated by the short, five-month time scale over which the
review of these 264 types of public body was undertaken. Thus, one agency respondent
told us that, six weeks after the reformwas announced, civil servants in the sponsor min-
istry requested that the body itself provide a report on the implications of the reform
(Interview 12). Such information asymmetry provides an opportunity for agencies to
engage in a debate about the proposed reforms at the level of technical feasibility rather
than political principle, and thus offers a point of leverage towards their preferred out-
come. In the case of the SIA, for example, the ministry was not fully aware that the
security industry itself had lobbied for the creation of this regulatory body and valued
its work. The technical problems of relaxing this regulatory regime, combined with
the protests of the SIA’s security industry constituents, overcame the sunk political costs
incurred by announcing the reform, and its proposed abolition was rescinded. The avail-
ability of such opportunities means that agencies may alter their behavior in the course
of the reform agenda. For example, the MLA initially accepted the decision but subse-
quently moved to exert influence over proposals, while the UK Film Council was
initially vocally against abolition but moved, over time, to a position of accepting them
but seeking to exert influence over the way they were implemented.
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Profiling the Response
A second aspect of bodies’ strategic action involves the extent to which they
operated in public or private and the nature of their strategizing in each case. The
strong normative constraints on agencies are important here. When bodies made
public statements, which all did at various points in the process, they were typically
uncritical of government policy in relation to the proposed reforms. However,
behind this bland and apparently uniform public presence, there were sometimes
very active strategies in private to inform government of the consequences and
shortcomings of proposals in relation to functions and to suggest other possibilities.
For example, one respondent observed,
In public, we were always scrupulously careful to support government
policy and to respect government’s right to take decisions on these sorts
of things. We would go out of our way to make it work as well as possible
in the interest of [the people who use our services]. In private, we were
pushing for our [alternative] concept as hard as we possibly could because
we felt that was the best way to get something that was worth keeping out
of what was always rather a mess. (Interview 2)
This was not a uniform approach. Another interviewee commented, ‘‘There didn’t
seem to me to be any point in putting one thing to Government and then speaking
privately that actually we’re after something else and trying to do under the
counter deals with people, almost asking them to act as third parties on our behalf’’
(Interview 6), leading them to refrain from public protest. The choices reflected in
these two examples illustrate the interviewees’ reading of the local context for
reform; in other words, the politics associated with their sponsor ministry’s approach
to reform rather than the Cabinet Office’s overall policy, and the extent to which
a dual response of public support and private lobbying would secure the changes
that they desired.
Mobilizing a Response
The final aspect of strategic action is the extent to which agencies act alone or as
part of a wider constituency of stakeholders. While agencies are often viewed as iso-
lated actors, in five cases there was a sustained reaction not just from the body con-
cerned but from other actors, be they members of the House of Lords, pressure
groups, professional and industry organizations, or the public, while in the other
seven cases the agency largely acted alone (see Table 2). These different action stra-
tegies do not reflect a simple choice made by agencies; rather, they are the product of
strategic calculation discussed earlier. Indeed, in the cases examined here, agencies
had differing opportunity to be part of a broad mobilization challenging reform,
in line with their degree of embeddedness. They initiated wider campaigns to differ-
ent degrees, and experienced changing attitudes among (and hence actions taken by)
exogenous actors across the period examined.
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First, the extent to which stakeholders mobilized around the threat to an agency
varied. The YJB, SIA, Chief Coroner, UK Film Council, and Forestry Commission
were well-embedded and their impending reform provoked a considerable mobiliza-
tion in opposition. In contrast, Consumer Focus and EHRC lacked strong, positive
support networks. There was little stakeholder reaction to the proposed reform of
Consumer Focus, because although ‘‘people thought it was a bad idea . . . relatively
few people cared about it so much that they were willing to . . . say that’’ (Interview
1). Elsewhere, the EHRC was felt to have misjudged its strategy, with one intervie-
wee reflecting, ‘‘If we’d been smart we would have focused much more on persuading
the stakeholders to be active’’ (Interview 10).
Secondly, differences can be observed in agencies’ attempts to actively cultivate
a campaign. As noted above in the discussion of norms, bodies are constrained by
certain conventions which limit their ability to oppose government. Nevertheless,
agencies’ strategies differed in those cases in which stakeholder support was evident,
with some bodies actively sanctioning or encouraging campaigns and others
retaining independence. For example, the YJB and SIA did not actively orchestrate
a campaign, but they were in contact with external actors who, in the case of the
YJB, confirmed that the Board were ‘‘comfortable with us saving them, or trying
to save them’’ (Interview 8). In other examples, such as the UK Film Council and
the Forestry Commission, external reactions emerged unprompted. In the latter case,
significant public outcry was apparent which was not ‘‘stimulated,’’ but was
rather an unexpected manifestation of ‘‘what people felt’’ (Interview 13). Indeed,
one stakeholder reported that the Commission itself ‘‘didn’t want to be seen to be
lobbying’’ (Interview 14), prompting others to act of their own accord. Similarly,
a UK Film Council respondent commented that their reaction was
. . . largely independent . . .There was some sort of Facebook campaign at
the time, which the Film Council didn’t set up at all. It had been set up
independently. And there were all sorts of articles which various people
had written independently and on the back of that, other supporters of
the Film Council had written independently. So I suppose we were sur-
prised at the depth of feeling that emanated, but there wasn’t a detailed,
concerted effort on the Film Council’s behalf at all. (Interview 12)
The MLA, in contrast, made a conscious, strategic decision not to call for
support as they ‘‘didn’t want to start a campaign, so there wasn’t a flag to rally
around’’ (Interview 5). A similar position was taken by the AJTC. This was one
of the most contentious proposals in terms of the amount of time spent on the
primary and secondary legislation needed to enact the reform. However, the body
stood outside the vocal campaign by stakeholders and did not lobby during the
long process through which legislators questioned ministers, as a letter from the
chair to the minister makes clear: ‘‘[If there is] any suggestion of ‘campaigning’
or similar activity, I should state that—beyond the submission of our Written
Evidence—I had no contact at all with the Committee, its Members or its Clerk’’
(AJTC 2013).
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There were changes over time in the level of stakeholder mobilization, as in the
cases of the HTA, HFEA, and Consumer Focus. In part, this reflects the transience
of the reform proposals themselves. For example, HTA stakeholders were initially
unconcerned by the planned merger but mobilized as further details emerged
and the consequences became clearer. Similarly, Consumer Focus stakeholders were
initially quiescent, but the consultation process that followed publication of the
reform proposals prompted a reaction.
CODIFYING AGENCY STRATEGIES
Our article casts new light on the politics of administrative reform. The boards
of the public bodies we studied are far from passive recipients of the government’s
restructuring proposals. They are active players who appraise the context’s strategic
selectivity and, on this basis, develop responses to the termination, merger, or
downsizing proposals with which they are faced. Our research demonstrates that
organizational survival is not necessarily their prime concern. Agency boards exhibit
a principled acceptance of the right of government to abolish, merge, or otherwise
reform their organizations, subject to parliamentary approval, and in general
subscribe to a self-denying ordinance by refraining from publicly challenging reform
proposals. However, they are willing to articulate in public the case for the continu-
ance in some other organizational configuration of the functions performed by their
agencies; for example, as a departmental unit, advisory committee, or non-profit
entity. Our analysis also demonstrates the capacity of the UK’s parliamentary
constitution to facilitate implementation of the government’s proposals, with the
majority of the 165 types of agencies in the program having been reformed within
three years (National Audit Office 2014). This provides an important contrast to the
divided government system in the US and thus emphasises the importance of locating
theoretical explanations of agency termination within specific constitutional contexts.
We identify three archetypical strategies adopted by agencies in response to reform
proposals:
Technical expert: The agency’s reading of the context leads it to conclude that
information asymmetries at the technical level make the political principals
vulnerable to well-evidenced recommendations intended to retain at least some
of the functions of the agency, even if the organisation itself is abolished. The
context, therefore, is strategically selective in terms of favouring the application
of arguments that privilege technical expertise (e.g., Consumer Focus, SIA).
Network node: The agency regards itself as well-embedded in a stakeholder network,
providing a node around which other actors mobilize and publicly challenge.
The agency may provide information to the network, but does not itself engage
in public opposition to the reform. The strategic selectivity of the context
is towards the exercise of political influence by influential actors and in public
arenas (e.g., AJTC, YJC).
Marginal adaptor: The way in which the agency reads the strategically selective
context is that there is only room for marginal change to the proposals. This
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is likely to be due to the overwhelming political commitment to reform. The
agency adopts the strategy of working with its sponsor ministry to realize the
reforms, but takes the opportunity to propose marginal changes where it
believes these will lead to a better outcome (e.g., MTA, HEFA).
Although individual agencies exemplify these approaches, in most cases agencies
developed combinations of strategic response that changed over time. Typically,
the initial response was robust, but this then changed to a greater accommodation
of the proposals in the light of an appraisal of the degree of commitment by govern-
ment. In the Audit Commission case, for example, the board knew nothing of the
reform proposal until a few hours before it was made public, expressed considerable
concern at the technical and governance implications, but subsequently proceeded to
work closely with the ministry to close down activities and create a small residuary
body.
An obvious next step for our work is to identify the extent to which different stra-
tegies are successful in moderating reform proposals or having them withdrawn. This
is a question we are pursuing in the wider project from which this paper arises. It will
require the reform strategy typology to be validated and data to be gathered from a
larger sample of agencies in order that regularities can be determined. Pursuing this
approach will connect our work with population ecology analyses. In principle, it
should be possible to code agency responses and incorporate these as an independent
variable into such analysis. To our knowledge, this kind of study has not yet been
undertaken, but would greatly enhance understanding of agency reform.
Explaining agency responses to reform is of great importance in an international
context where politics motivates organizational change. As governments attempt to
reform their agency landscapes, policymakers, and public bodies can benefit from a
greater understanding of how reforms can be effectively implemented or opposed.
On the one hand, politicians and civil servants can utilize this information to max-
imize the effectiveness of their reforms, helping to develop proposals which neutra-
lize public body opposition and showing how to exert pressure to maximize
compliance from agencies. On the other hand, agency chairs and chief executives
can benefit by understanding how strategies may be developed and the contingent
factors to take into account.
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NOTES
1. The organizations in question are officially classified as ‘‘non-departmental public
bodies,’’ conventionally shortened to ‘‘public bodies’’ and popularly known as ‘‘quangos,’’
together with a very small number of non-ministerial departments and public corporations.
Public bodies undertake executive, advisory, regulatory, or quasi-judicial functions and are
deemed to have greater autonomy from ministers than the UK’s ‘‘executive agencies.’’
2. Public bodies can be divided into those where a single organization undertakes a
function, and those organized on a geographical basis and where multiple organizations of
the same type exist. The 264 types of public body comprise over 900 individual organisations.
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